Methodologically, this paper frames the opportunity cost of any merger as the value of the alternative deals it precludes or defers. This challenges the standard eventstudy hypothesis that stock markets benchmark the value of a merger deal by the profits the partners would have earned in stand-alone activity. Substantively, the paper finds that megamergers in banking show two size-related exceptions to the prototypical result that acquirer stock value tends to be unaffected or to fall when a merger is announced.
It is often presumed that stock-market reactions to merger announcements reliably predict the post-acquisition performance of the combining firms. To the extent that this standard event-study hypothesis is true, a resource-saving three-stage process can be used to pinpoint megamergers that might deserve special scrutiny. The first round of tests would seek to interpret the size and distribution of the changes in stockholder value that occur on or around the merger's announcement date. These first-round tests would look for evidence consistent with the hypothesis that increased size per se might generate regulatory or monopoly rents. When such evidence emerges, closer analysis would be called for, and two further rounds of investigation would kick in.
Second-round tests would investigate whether regression models could fairly allocate a substantial portion of announcement-created stockholder value to regulatory or monopoly-power benefits. If so, staff analysts would be directed to undertake a detailed third-round econometric investigation to isolate the technical-efficiency and diversification benefits that the proposed combination might generate. The third-round investigation would formally audit the partners' projections and develop additional data needed to carry out a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of how to ameliorate the merger's undesirable effects. This paper limits itself to indicative first-round and second-round tests. It begins by motivating and conducting event-study tests of the stock market's reaction to the largest bank mergers and acquisitions announced in the U.S. during each of the years 1991 to 1998. Previous studies have found that the value of the target's stock usually increases, but that this increase tends to occur at the expense of the shareholders of the acquiring institution. In what we may call the standard corporate merger, the price of the acquirer tends either to be unaffected or to decline somewhat when merger plans are announced. For example, in a study of 101 1968 -1986 tender offers, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1999 report that the mean deflections of stock prices caused by merger announcements (so-called "abnormal returns) are slightly negative for acquirers and markedly positive for target firms. Using a five-day pre-announcement window and a 1985-1991 sample of 153 large-bank mergers, Houston and Ryngaert (1994) found significantly positive abnormal returns for targets and significantly negative abnormal returns for acquirers, with little evidence that the average bank merger creates any value. 4 In a study that uses an innovative statistical method to analyze 154 banking organizations that acquired other banks during the slightly different sample period 1989-95, Cyree and DeGennaro (1997) also found that bank acquirers seldom earned an announcement return.
The tests conducted here identify some size-related megamerger "exceptions" to the finding that merger announcements in banking seldom create statistically significant net increases in stock market value. In interpreting this result, the paper challenges the standard event-study hypothesis that announcement-day excess returns reliably predict post-acquisition improvements in firm performance. It argues that event studies weigh an announced deal against previous market evaluations of the partners' other potential targets and acquirers, so that a poor acquirer return may indicate that speculators had previously identified a better hypothetical partner for the acquirer than the particular target it actually chose to marry.
Our regressions establish that patterns of value creation differ with the nature of the target firm. When a deposit institution is taken over, acquirer value grows with target size in worrisome ways. Giant banking organizations gain value from becoming more gigantic and gain additional value from absorbing bank targets that were previously competing in-state.
The larger a target is, the larger and more complex its acquisition is apt to make the banking organization that acquires it. With increased size, complexity, and market share come increases in market power and political clout. Increased market power engenders monopoly rents and increased market share enhances an institution's significance to members of the congressional delegations of the states in which it operates. Increased political clout intensifies incentive conflicts facing top regulators.
The Long Term Capital Management rescue shows that increased portfolio complexity makes it harder for regulators to monitor and enforce limits on an institution's risk exposures. In particular, any merger that strengthens market presumptions that a megabank acquirer is "Too Big to Fail and Unwind" -or, more accurately, too big to discipline adequately (TBTDA)--lowers that entity's financing costs. Funding costs fall because the institution's increased size enhances its access to unpriced de facto taxpayer guarantees of its uninsured debt (Todd and Thomson, 1990) . How much power and clout is created and how these capacities are expected to be exercised are important questions that event-study experimentation cannot directly answer.
The simplest explanation of our results is that, when a large bank absorbs a very large target bank, stockholders expect the acquirer to price its products less competitively in the future and to use its expanded political clout to extract additional regulatory forbearances. The unpleasant social costs this simple explanation implies make the costs and benefits of banking megamergers an urgent area for public-policy research.
Although the technology-driven contestability of modern banking markets may be expected to discipline postmerger efforts to exercise monopoly power, mechanisms for reining in TBTDA rents are crude and unreliable. Moreover, the demise of GlassSteagall and Banking Holding Company Act restrictions on U.S. banks' ability to affiliate with other types of financial firms threatens to make TBTDA subsidies more widely accessible than ever before.
It should be clear that TBTDA and monopoly benefits are not the only possible explanations for the results we observe. Our profession prides itself on being able to weave sophisticated counterintuitive explanations for what a layperson would deem to be straightforward phenomena. In line with this predilection, models could be devised that would attribute the correlation between target size and announcement-day value creation to nonlinearities in scale and scope economies (particularly in extending a megabank's brand to new products and customers) and attribute the incremental value that emerges in in-state deals to the avoidance of distance-related operational expense. However, until a more sophisticated model has been validated econometrically, Occam's Razor i and
Bayesian inference both imply that officials should adopt the straightforward interpretation as a working hypothesis, and this implication is reinforced by asymmetries in the size of the costs that banks, customers and taxpayers face if the simple interpretation does not apply. The TBTDA and network-control dangers implied by the simple reading of announcement-day patterns of value creation transmit to top regulatory officials duties of vigilant regulatory response (Hoenig, 1999 ) that extend far beyond traditional efforts to protect household and small-business customers by postmerger branch-office divestitures that limit market concentration in particular locales.
I. What Benchmark Evaluations Drive Announcement-Day Movements in Stock Prices?
Banks are in the information and dealmaking business. In negotiating and executing deals, information is simultaneously an input, an intermediate product, and a final output. The informational function of the bank works to support its dealmaking function by helping to identify and value the pluses and minuses of every deal the bank holds or considers.
The Importance of Intangibles
The information a bank uses is neither freely available nor completely reliable and verifiable. Each bank strives to build up and maintain its capacity to access, store, process, and transfer information at low cost. In principle, the discounted value of the future dealmaking profits that may be fairly attributed to the bank's ability to exercise its special informational capacities represents an intangible asset of the bank.
The value of a bank is the net value of its intangible and tangible assets and liabilities. Tangible assets and liabilities (TA and TL) may be defined as balance-sheet positions that may be traded individually to another institution. Intangible items consist of rights granted by a government or private party and positions that --although lacking a separate physical existence--may be used in conjunction with a bank's other assets to generate profits. A bank's intangible assets (IA) include its firm-specific informational and dealmaking capacities and various real options (RO) that these capacities create.
In the U.S., Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) permit very few intangible items to be booked as part of a bank's accounting net worth. However, economic net worth (ENW) is the difference between TA+IA and TL+IL. Equivalently, ENW (i.e., a bank's market capitalization) may be expressed as the sum of the bank's tangible and intangible net worth (TNW + INW):
Megabank mergers and acquisitions are merely a particular form of dealmaking.
An acquirer (A) buys the tangible and intangible balance sheet of the target (T) from its shareholders for a bundle (B A ) of tangible assets (or liabilities) and combines the resulting positions with its own. Figure One illustrates the economic balance sheets of the premerger entities.
The tangible net worth of the combined postmerger entity (TNW C ) is easy to define and relatively verifiable:
The value of C's intangible net worth (INW C ) is more problematical. This is because the merger opens some real options that would not exist without the merger and closes some of the options the individual partners' previously enjoyed. Williams (1993) emphasizes that changes in ownership structure can greatly influence the value of real options.
Options created include opportunities to apply superior technologies, to marry the newly combined entity down the line with still other firms and to cross-sell to the customer base of both firms products that the premerger banks had not offered before.
Options closed include opportunities to merge with some other partners and (perhaps) to operate some branches whose market areas overlap.
In purchase accounting, GAAP requires the target's tangible items and so-called "identified intangibles" to be marked to market (MM) and the difference between the purchase price and MM is booked as "goodwill" (G). By itself, the value of G provides no clue as to whether a merger creates or destroys stockholder value. Figure Two clarifies that whether a hypothetical merger creates or destroys value depends on whether the change in intangible net worth (∆IA-∆IL) exceeds or falls short of the value of the assets that are being conveyed to target shareholders:
A richer question that the stock market must address is whether the premerger resources of A or T could earn even better returns if they were combined with the resources of a different merger partner. The most predictable postmerger changes in intangible value would be those that would be available or "common" to any potential acquirer of T. We denote market estimates of these common benefits by k. We assume that these are predominantly efficiency benefits from installing new management and that estimates of k do not change during the process of negotiating the merger deal. Other estimated intangible benefits would be specific to the particular strategies and opportunities each of m potential acquirers the market has identified would bring to the negotiating Our analysis makes a number of convenient assumptions. We analyze announcement-day price movements under the assumption that -although the acquirer might be forced to raise its bid--every announced deal is certain to be completed. In this case, each announcement reduces uncertainty about three things: what targets will be acquired, who will acquire them, and whether a deal for T is currently being negotiated.
Differences in the amount of uncertainty to be resolved can explain the James and Weir finding that, in 60 bank acquisitions announced during 1972-83, acquirer returns proved positively related to the number of alternative targets and negatively related to the number of other potential bidders in the target's market.
Prior to the announcement, we presume that risk-neutral speculators assign a probability q T to the possibility that bank T will be taken over. The lower is q T , the more "surprising" the market would regard the takeover announcement. We also presume that speculators assign each target's potential acquirers a probability Π i of success and an expected cost of D i for merger-related charges and revenue displacements. We also suppose that a potential acquirer's probability of gaining the target would rise with the partner-specific values it can create with the target. Finally, to avoid complicating the exposition by discount factors, we exclude from the k's and the D i the wedge of present value that is surrendered in waiting for a deal to unfold.
Deals Between An Unambiguous Target and Unambiguous Acquirer
We start by looking at a target bank that is simultaneously considered certain to be acquired and certain never to be an acquirer. On the day before T's takeover is announced, the takeover premium TP T (t-1) imbedded in its stock price would be the expected value of the successful bid B A :
Unless another acquirer (AA) is expected to surface, the expected value of the bid on the announcement day t would move to B A , the compensation set by A. In this case, the announcement-day change in the target's takeover premium would be:
Equation (5) If we assume that speculators do not view A as a potential target in any alternative combination, the change in the best acquirer's potential takeover benefits from acquiring only T can be calculated in a similar manner. On announcement-day eve,
would equal the market's expected value of A's net return from merging with T in due time:
It is reasonable to assume that merging with T puts A's managers in what we may call a "digestive state" during the time it takes to assimilate the operations of T. During this interval, A's prospects for merging with other targets are reduced. This adverse effect on the acquirer's other takeover options (∆MO A ) might be negligible for very small targets.
On the other hand, although the diversion of management time from other deals might be expected to grow with the complexity of the merger, predeal planning and due diligence can limit the duration of the digestion period.
The unobservability of prior effort makes the effect of complexity on projected dealmaking costs and other merger prospects ambiguous. Uncertainty about k A probably also increases with a deal's complexity. Our second-round statistical tests use the onbalance-sheet asset size of the target (TA T ) as a proxy for partner-specific benefits and complexity, so that we write the announcement-day takeover premium for A as:
with the sign of ) (
to be determined empirically. The announcement-day change in
TP can be found by subtracting equation (6) from equation (7). If k A and D A don't change on the announcement day: 
The standard interpretation of event-study outcomes presumes that stock markets value each deal against the benchmark of the profit opportunities the partners would possess if they were left to operate in a stand-alone mode. But the true opportunity cost of any merger is the value of the deals it precludes or defers. Opportunity-cost analysis clarifies that the benchmark that should govern announcement-day reactions to a megadeal is how target and acquirer resources would perform in the best alternative megadeal whose execution the announced merger either precludes or makes much less likely to occur.
In part, the asymmetry in the announcement-day movement of acquirer and target stock prices that researchers typically observe reflects asymmetry in alternative partners' ability to improve on a suboptimal deal after it is announced. Although the acquirer's bid may easily be forced higher, it is unlikely to go down. This is because each merger announcement conveys information about the target to any superior acquirer and gives that acquirer a hard value to bid against. Acquirer A's managers know that any alternative acquirer (AA) who sees substantial value in the target is apt to woo target shareholders by offering a richer deal and that the process of taking a shareholder vote on A's offer creates an urgent deadline for AA to do so. In contrast, potential partners in better deals that the acquirer A's managers may have overlooked or even sought to thwart have less incentive to throw themselves immediately into the acquirer's arms. Whether they are prospective targets or acquirers, they know that completing and digesting the announced megadeal will, at least for awhile, restrict acquirer A's ability to contemplate a second megamerger. Similarly, we might observe a decline in
TP for a number of different reasons:
(1) because A's managers surfaced adverse information about k A and D A during the duediligence process, (2) because A's managers were pursuing personal benefits at stockholder expense, (3) because A paid a surprisingly high price for T, or (4) because the merger options being set aside were extremely valuable.
Deals Between a Switch-Hitting Target and Acquirer
Speculators may envision real-world targets and acquirers as occupying alternate sides of different hypothetical deals. We label such targets and acquirers as switch hitters (ST and SA). Switch-hitting introduces an additional term into the takeover premiums and expands the set of merger options that an acquirer closes when a deal is announced.
For switch-hitters, the announcement-eve takeover premium is the sum of two conditional expectations: (1) the expected value of its net takeover premium given that it is a target and (2) expected value of its net takeover premium given that it is an acquirer.
Each conditional expectation is the product of the probability (q) of ending up on a particular side of a merger deal (A or T) and the expected net benefits that speculators believe will occur in that particular state.
Before the deal is announced, four dealmaking states of the world exist: ST=T, ST=A, SA=T, and SA=A. At t-1, speculators assign each state a corresponding probability. We denote these probabilities as Using this notation, the announcement-eve takeover premium for ST and SA become:
The announcement-day value of each premium replaces the unrealized conditional expectation with the dealmaking values that actually obtain and subtracts the value of the real options surrendered in the deal. For a switch-hitting target,
As before, the option of other would-be acquirers to bid on the target remains open. The inequality in (13) allows for the possibility that another acquirer may subsequently enter the bidding. Even if we assume SA is the best acquirer for ST, TP ST will be enriched and TP SA (t) reduced by an amount slightly in excess of the market's estimate of the difference between an amount B * equal to (k i -D i ) of the second-best acquirer and SA's initial bid B A .
II. Focus of Announcement-Day Event-Study Tests Event-study test procedures turn on two benchmarks for announcement-day stock-price returns. Excess returns relative to either benchmark might indicate that a particular megamerger promises partner-specific regulatory or monopoly-power benefits.
To express these benchmarks, we let MC A (t) and MC T (t) represent the respective values of acquirer and target stock on the date the merger is announced. MC A (t-1) and MC T (t-1) represent these stocks' aggregate pre-announcement values.
Analyses of standard corporate takeovers usually find that competition for a desirable target from other potential acquirers leads an acquirer to offer a bid B A that drives up the announcement-day price of the target firm without usually experiencing a favorable movement in its own stock price. However, in a banking megamerger, we might expect partner-specific benefits to prove important for two reasons. First, competition for targets is curtailed because few target banks are large enough, diverse enough, or risky enough to make much difference in an organization's postmerger profitability. Second, substantial regulatory and monopoly-power benefits can be expected to accrue reliably to only a small number of acquirers.
The benchmark for what we call "strong case" evidence of the possibility of undesirable private benefits occurs when the acquirer's and the target's stock both rise on the announcement day. We characterize this case as evidencing "Hypersynergy":
A weaker case of "Aggregate Value Creation" occurs when the acquirer's stock price falls, but does not fall far enough to prevent the pro-forma market capitalization of the combined entity from increasing:
The hypersynergistic case is consistent with the idea that the source of acquirer's stock-price appreciation is something that cannot easily be captured by other bidders and that may benefit each partner through either their joint domination of a transactions and/or information network or improved opportunities to increase their leverage and other risk exposures. The strength of hypersynergy criterion is that, to the extent that the particular benefits of a merger are unique to the acquirer, A can outbid T's next-best partner without having to transfer A's benefits entirely to T's stockholders. In particular, whenever a merger's incremental value lies in strengthening safety-net guarantees or integrating control over an important informational or transactional network, the announcement of the deal ought to favor both stocks. In contrast, whenever a deal is motivated merely by acquirer hubris or other types of managerial agency costs, we may reasonably expect competition among rational alternative bidders to force the empirebuilding acquirer into making an overbid that would depress MC A (t). Empirical studies of postmerger experience suggest that speculators ought to treat partner-specific savings in operating costs as doubtful and slow to materialize (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Houston, James, and Ryngaert, 1999) . We adopt this view as a working hypothesis and also hypothesize that partner-specific increases in monopoly power that do not trace to TBTDA-enhanced branding or to improved control of a transactional or informational network are unlikely to be durable. In markets that are globalizing because of increased contestability, the threat of new entry makes nonnetwork sources of monopoly power hard to sustain.
The weaker-case Value Creation benchmark is harder to interpret. As we have seen, unless the merger completely surprises speculators, announcement-day price movements omit some of the economic value the merger conveys to target and acquirer stockholders. To the extent that a bank is seen to be a highly likely target, most of the economic value it has to offer an average acquirer will have already been impounded into its preannouncement market capitalization (Calomiris and Karceski, 1998) . This means that announcement-day hypersynergy is a sufficient, but not necessary indicator that substantial economic value is created by the combination. The potential importance of unmeasured value creation makes it prudent to subject mergers that manifest weak-case value creation to at least our second round of tests. For mergers that either meet or nearly meet the weak-case criterion, it is incumbent on regulatory staff economists to look for evidence of increased monopoly power or enhanced regulatory avoidance.
III. Event-Study Test Results
To test the hypothesis that stockholders derived monopoly or regulatory benefits from recent U.S. megamergers, we must first develop operational definitions for "megabanks" and "megamergers." We initially define a megabank as one whose parent holding company ranks among the top 12 U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) either in asset size or in market capitalization. One justification for focusing on the top 12 BHCs is that this criterion for being Too Big to Fail (TBTDA) was stated by the Comptroller of the Currency in Congressional testimony explaining the motivation for the Continental Illinois bailout (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990) . Table 2 In 1998, these deals were listed among the all-time top 10 bank and thrift deals in market value by Nickerson (1998 Table 3 adjusts announcement-day stock returns for merger partners in these topten deposit-institution deals to remove the effect of the average price appreciation earned that day on the S&P 500. The empirical literature on bank mergers finds that the stock prices of acquirers seldom appreciate on the announcement day (e.g., Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Calomiris and Karceski, 1998; Clark, 1988; Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Cyree and DeGennaro, 1997; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Houston, James and Ryngaert, 1999; and Willmarth, 1995) . This supports our working hypothesis that, unless acquirer-specific regulatory or monopolistic benefits exist, a very small proportion of acquirers would experience a favorable announcement-day price movement. Moreover, one may infer that adverse regulatory responses to megabank price movements are expected to be softened by lobbying activity. Otherwise, the fear that antitrust and regulatory issues would lead conscientious authorities to prevent a blockbuster deal's completion would exert offsetting downward pressure on the acquirer's stock price whenever its announcement-day value advanced strongly.
In contrast to results for ordinary banking mergers, the calculations presented in Table 3 indicate that the acquirer's market-adjusted stock price increased in three banking megamergers and that the value of the combined enterprise increased substantially in these cases. These hypersynergistic cases all involve partners that ranked among the nation's top-five banks. Two other instances show better than a 5 percent weightedaverage return. Both of these entail the takeover of a giant thrift institution. Only the Norwest-Wells merger fails the weaker value-creation criterion outright, while the Banc One-First Chicago NBD and First Union-CoreStates mergers produce only a 0.1 percent weighted-average return.
The wide range of weighted-average returns shown in Table 3 clarifies that sometimes the benefits of banking megamergers either are fully anticipated or are regarded by the market as inferior to some of the acquirer's other feasible deals. Market participants habitually worry about disinformation, acquirer empire building, and the sustainability of projected improvements in profitability. Houston, James, and Ryngaert (1999) show that analysts are particularly skeptical about allegations that merged operations will generate large operating-cost savings. Keefe, Bruyette & Woods found that only two of the top 15 banking megamergers of 1997 and 1998 met their earnings projections for 1999 (Padgett, 1999) . Figure Three displays the six worst outcomes.
To the extent that some uncertainty is apt to be resolved in every megamerger announcement, targets may be expected to experience value creation. That in four of the all-time deals the combined mega-enterprise created little weighted-average net announcement-day value is consistent with the hypothesis that the deals these acquirers selected may have closed more-valuable real options. Nevertheless, this analysis of the all-time top-ten U.S. banking deals suggests that partner-specific regulatory and monopolistic benefits emerge in mergers in which the target is one of the nation's very largest banks or thrifts.
Value Creation in the Top Deals of 1991-1998
Procedures we have labeled as "second-round" tests seek to identify some of the determinants of excess announcement-day returns. Hypotheses of this kind cannot be tested effectively using a sample of only ten deals. To expand the investigation efficiently, we need to define a megamerger differently. We begin by identifying the largest 15 banking mergers that took place in each of the eight years 1991-1998. Table 4 summarizes the means, standard deviations, and number (N) of observations collected on characteristics of targets, acquirers, and mergers whose effect on announcement-day returns we intend to investigate.
In six of the potential 120 cases, we were not able to assign a precise announcement date. Appendix Table 1 identifies three 1998 observations we eliminated because we couldn't locate the announcement-day return for the acquirer on CRSP tapes.
In second-round tests, we dropped a few more cases because of difficulties in finding accounting data on asset size for target thrifts and securities firms.
The average asset size of the targets is half the size of their acquirers. In line with other studies of bank mergers, the mean announcement-day return for targets ( T X ) is large and statistically significant, while the mean excess return for acquirers A X is negative and significant. However, what is unusual in our results is that the weightedaverage excess return for the combination ( W X ) is a marginally significant 0.83 percent.
Looking at the frequency distribution of X A , X T , and X W reveals that, in 29 of the megamergers for which we can calculate all three variables, the acquirer's excess return (X A ) is positive. Moreover, in about half of these hypersynergistic megamergers, X A exceeds 1.0 percent. The target's excess return is positive in 82.3 percent of the cases.
Finally, the weighted-average excess return of target and acquirer (X W ) is positive 52.2 percent of the time.
Appendix Table 1 lists the particular megamergers that survived the target excessreturn screening process. The third and fifth columns note the rank of partners who would meet the top-12 BHC size criterion employed in the previous subsection.
The purpose of constructing the larger sample is to test whether and how projected megamerger benefits change with a few easily verified characteristics of the partner firms. Tables 5 and 6 present the results of a series of parsimonious second-round regression experiments. These models account for and confirm the potentially dilutive financial-structure impact of the deal on acquirer stockholders, by introducing a binary variable STK that equals one when the acquirer uses stock in its bid package and equals zero otherwise. Table 5 explores alternate regression models for acquirer excess returns, while Table 6 seeks to explain the weighted-average return found for the combined enterprise.
The first two panels of cannot provide compelling evidence, the securities-firms targets (SFT) in our sample generate significantly less incremental and weighted-average value than bank and thrift targets as their asset size increases. As with narrow banking market-extension mergers, this is consistent with the idea that partner-specific benefits are less in mergers that diversify or extend a banking organization's scope than in those which increase a megabank's share of its traditional markets. It suggests that megabanks may be paying to acquire proven investment-banking talent, but are not expected to retain at least some of their target's key players. Fourth, individually introducing the assets of the combined enterprise or a binary intercept-shift dummy variable to indicate when a merger involves a top-5 BHC does not significantly improve the model's fit.
To double-check the potential importance of the binary variables, we re-estimated the model of panel one, interacting both the slope and intercept of target assets with each dummy variable. As before, B 5 shows no significant effect for either parameter. Because a significantly negative slope shift did emerge for out-of-state and securities-firm acquisitions, we designate the regressions displayed in panels two and three as our working models of X A .
Except that the intrastockholder transfers from including stock in the bid package wash out (as they ought ) across the combined enterprise, regression experiments attempting to explain R W produce parallel results. As shown in Table 6 , the asset size of an acquirer's deposit-institution target is the single most important variable, and its effect is significantly less in out-of-state acquisitions than in in-state deals. The intercepts and slopes found in these experiments imply that net stock market value is created even for combinations in which deposit-institution target assets are barely in the neighborhood of $1 billion.
IV. Reasons for Fearing that TBTDA Remains Alive and Well
Our findings raise regulatory and antitrust questions that public-policy economists should investigate closely. The central issue is how much of the increased stock-market value is generated in the private real economy and how much is generated by presumptions that the enterprise's improved postmerger interface with government officials can reduce the costs of its debt financing (Kane, 1991; Boyd and Graham, 1998) .
Because the standard microeconomic theory of firm value treats a firm's government interface as a sideshow, an economist's instinct is to presume that in banking megamergers, too, the value created would trace to improvements in an enterprise's operating revenues and costs. The argument that follows suggests that competitive forces at work in banking today make antitrust activity and interventions to assure efficient resource use potentially less important than policies that might lessen the political pressures that make megabanks "too big to discipline adequately."
Limitations on Operating Sources of Net Economic Value
In the absence of TBTDA benefits, a merged enterprise can create net economic value in three broad ways. First, the merger may enhance future banking revenue by increasing monopoly power over either network operations or loan and deposit prices.
Second, the merger may enhance banking revenue by opening new territory: reaching new customers or making additional portfolio diversification and product lines feasible.
Third, the merger may generate operating-cost savings by consolidating locations, equipment, and staffs.
In a megamerger, increased monopoly power is most likely to develop from fuller network control and from brandable products like credit cards. Other forms of enhanced monopoly power figure to be short-lived. Partly this is because a megamerger cannot go forward, until antitrust officials and banking regulators determine that, in the various markets in which the partners have previously competed, adverse competitive effects are mitigated, for example, by branch sales. Countervailing pressure against monopoly pricing will also be exerted by de novo entry in the postmerger marketplace (Berger, Bonime, Goldberg and White, 1999) . In recent decades, technological and regulatory change has greatly extended the geographic reach of nonlocal banks and the ability of nonbank financial institutions to offer bank-like products. Mergers and countermergers are vehicles by which technological change is steadily integrating financial markets across regions and countries and strengthening the actual and potential competitive pressure exercised by nonlocal banks and by firms with nonbank charters. Credit cards are increasingly national and global products, while ATM networks and interstate branching are pushing checking accounts in a similar direction. Hence, from a publicpolicy point of view, the substantial contestability of modern banking markets can be relied upon to generate strong counterpressure against aggressive monopoly pricing.
Although far from irrelevant, the public-policy implications of increased monopoly power in banking mergers are apt to prove of second-order importance.
Empirical studies show that the importance of projected reductions in operating costs is habitually exaggerated (Houston, James, and Ryngaert, 1999) . In all mergers, press releases routinely project operating-cost savings from consolidating the office networks and staffs of the partner institutions. Although empirical studies sometimes find significant cost savings from consolidation (Calomiris and Karceski, 1998; Cornett and Tehranian, 1992) , projected improvements in operational efficiency often fail to be achieved ex post. Although technological change may lessen the relevance of past data, empirical studies indicate that alleged economies of scope are problematical and that operating economies of scale tend to peter out well before a bank reaches the TBTDA size range (Clark, 1988; pp. 16-33; Berger and Humphrey, 1990; Noulas, Ray and Miller, 1990, pp. 94-108) . Tables 5 and 6 support these doubts by finding a perverse impact for work-force size in explaining X A and X W . Skepticism about economies of scale and scope interact with concerns about empire building and managerial entrenchment (Gorton and Rosen, 1995) to lead outsiders to expect announcement-day press releases to "spin" the sources of consolidation profits in creative ways. Rational investors must be expected to steeply discount alleged operating-cost savings to allow for the difficulty of carrying out the necessary adjustments.
Realistically, the rate of discount applied to projected cost savings should be high and the rosy projections participants offer should be revised downward even when the quality and integrity of management at the acquiring institutions is perceived to be very high. First, because corporate customers and wealthy households can benefit from maintaining multiple banking relationships, the premerger customer bases of individual partners often exhibit hard-to-sustain overlaps. Knowledgeable customers commonly seek to play off one bank against another as a way of bargaining for better interest rates on loans and deposits. Many customers with joint relationships will move one or another segment of their premerger banking relationships to a competing entity. Second, downsizings typically entail expensive employee buyouts, while branch closings and most other forms of cost reduction threaten parallel reductions in the quality of at least some services customers value. The point is that aggregate customer requirements for floor space, front-office servicing facilities, tellers, automated teller machines, loan officers, and many aspects of back-office support cannot be cut much without creating unwelcome service deterioration or delays. Cost "savings" achieved by service cutbacks undermine customer relationships. For customers that greatly value service quality, implicit interest rates on loans rise and/or implicit interest rates on deposits fall. If the projected postmerger economies entail noticeably longer queues, evidence that affected customers are seeking better service elsewhere will rapidly temper the enterprise's initial cost-cutting zeal.
Why TBTDA Benefits Are Potentially Important TBTDA may be described as a breakdown in ordinary regulatory discipline and insolvency resolution that occurs when regulators encounter problems at an institution whose size, complexity, or political clout is substantial. The bureaucratic effort and reputational penalties top regulators experience from confronting and resolving an individual insolvency increase with all three of these variables. However, the presumption that complexity and clout correlate strongly with size explains why the name given the doctrine adopts asset size as a catch-all condition for qualifying status.
Incentives that undermine regulators' ability to discipline TBTDA banks are rooted in inescapable public-policy asymmetries (Kane, 1995) . A top banking regulator's reputation is harmed less by the banking insolvencies that are allowed to develop during his or her watch than by the surfacing of news that reveals to the public at large the longstanding weakness of a major bank. The attraction of TBTDA to policymakers is that forbearance makes insolvencies and risk exposures at the nation's most important institutions less visible to the newsmedia.
To make the TBTDA policy strategy less attractive to banking regulators, Title I of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) placed new constraints on insolvency resolution. It imposed on federal banking regulators duties of prompt corrective action and least-cost resolution. Section E of that Act's Title I specifies that resolution costs should be calculated "on a present-value basis, using a realistic discount rate." Arguably, the operative effect of FDICIA's constraints has been to increase the size threshold A * at which access to TBTDA subsidies kicks in.
iii However, recognizing regulators' conflicting social missions, the Act authorizes a "systemic risk" exception for cases where least-cost resolution "would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability." The systemic risk posed by a troubled firm grows with its size and complexity. To keep the systemic-risk exception from being used routinely, the law requires that the exception can only be triggered when the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Treasury jointly determine that such adverse effects exist. As a disincentive to making such determinations lightly, the General Accounting Office is required to evaluate the justification offered for every such determination that is made.
The Fed's 1998 intervention in resolving the capital shortage of Long Term
Capital Management shows that, even in the face of FDICIA restraints, TBTDA incentives remain strong (Financial Economists Roundtable, 1999) . Whenever a highlylevered large institution threatens to become insolvent, financial regulators face serious conflicts in their social missions. Besides maintaining regulatory discipline, they must worry about sustaining public confidence in the robustness of the financial system as a whole and minimizing the community disruption that would follow from winding up a mega-institution's tangled affairs. In addition to the bureaucratic and personal costs of prompt insolvency resolution, day-to-day efforts to promote these supplementary regulatory missions give federal authorities a predictable preference for helping to conceal economic insolvencies at important banks and for handling large-bank insolvencies in ways that keep uninsured creditors whole. The complexity of a liquidation and payout, the degree of community disruption, the risk of undermining confidence in other institutions, and even the agency's exposure to after-the-fact political criticism all increase with the size and complexity of a troubled institution. Hence, the larger an institution is, the smaller the chance that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will resort to asset liquidation and deposit payout in the event of closure.
Empirical research confirms the contention that, prior to FDICIA, TBTDA subsidies gave mega-institutions access to government-contributed risk capital (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990; Todd and Thomson, 1990; Black, Collins, Robinson, and Schweitzer, 1997; Angbazo and Saunders, 1995) . In principle, government risk capital reduces the private cost of funding a TBTDA institution's on-balance-sheet assets and off-balancesheet risk exposures. Routinely extending regulatory forbearances to stockholders and creditors of large, complex, or politically powerful institutions subsidizes any activity (including mergers) that makes an institution larger, riskier, more complex, or politically more powerful. TBTDA benefits distort patterns of competition between banks and nonbanks, between large and complex institutions and small and straightforward institutions, and even between domestic and foreign financial venues.
The present value of TBTDA-generated government risk capital, GC, is part of any mega-institution's market capitalization, MC. At each mega-institution, the market value of stockholder-contributed capital, SC, may be defined as:
GC varies over time with a bank's size and its borrowers' aggregate repayment prospects.
It also varies with elements of bank risk exposure that can be negotiated quickly, such as exposures to relative movements in interest rates and in foreign exchange rates.
Derivatives trading, in particular, allows inadequacies in risk-based capital regulation and in pricing deposit insurance and intraday credit to convey opportunities for megabanks to increase the value of GC rapidly if and when they wish. Ceteris paribus, GC increases whenever an institution increases the volatility of its future earnings or increases its leverage in clever ways that authorities either do not monitor in timely fashion or do not yet appropriately discipline.
A straightforward way to model the option-generating effects of TBTDA on megamerger incentives is to treat GC as kicking in at a particular asset-size threshold A=A * and increasing noticeably whenever a megabank's asset size increases substantially. A convenient approximation is to assume further that, for a given portfolio structure, either authorities or private creditors require each bank to maintain a market capitalization that is at least x percent of their total assets, where x increases with perceptions of the bank's overall exposure to loss:
In this model, TBTDA implies that the percentage requirement to hold stockholdercontributed capital would decline whenever an institution managed to increase its asset size substantially. Moreover, the decline would occur faster, the more sensitive TBTDA benefits are to increases in asset size.
Rearranging (18), the effective requirement for stockholder-contributed capital may be expressed as:
Since stockholder-contributed capital ratios decline with bank size, the consolidation of banking assets into very large institutions serves to economize on the amount of private capital in the industry. Unless small banks' leverage disadvantage is offset by advantageous tax and reserve-requirement treatment, TBTDA implies that stockholders in small and medium-size banks can create predictable value for themselves by planning to sell out to any very large institution. We have denoted this value by k and assumed it is imbedded in MC(t-1).
Model (19) implies the testable hypothesis that lower capital requirements and funding costs for TBTDA institutions in the U.S. encourage megamergers in banking and could influence the amount and distribution of the net value each megamerger creates.
When a post-merger institution ends up ranked more firmly among the largest financial organizations in the country, the merger improves the institution's access to de facto guarantees of its uninsured debt. Other things equal, the existence of TBTDA benefits in megamergers implies the hypothesis that the stock price of an acquiring megabank would go up roughly in proportion to opportunities for the postmerger enterprise to increase its leverage and to hold volatile portfolio positions. For stockholders of the two merging institutions, an enhanced entitlement to capital forbearance should immediately increase the capitalized value of implicit government guarantees of uninsured bank liabilities.
This implies that some of the unique integrative value a megamerger creates for acquirers should pass through to holders of their uninsured obligations. Although our limited data set does not allow us to investigate this phenomenon, it is consistent with the Fitch-IBCA credit-rating agency's 1999 decision to equalize the debt ratings of BHCs and their subsidiary banks.
V. Conclusion
As do all event studies, this paper raises questions it cannot decisively answer. It shows only that in the banking megamegers of 1991-98, stockholders of large-bank acquirers gained value when a deposit-institution target was large and that acquirers gained more value when a deposit-institution target was previously headquartered in the same state.
Without extensive further testing, one cannot rule out any number of socially comforting explanations for this result. That said, it must be recognized that our megabank results differ from those for ordinary corporate mergers and for smaller banking deals. The effect of size underscores the possibility that Too-Big-To-Discipline subsidies have distorted dealmaking incentives for megabanks and that the high leverage these firms maintain makes it easy for them to shift unaccounted risk onto taxpayers.
Governments everywhere have difficulty disciplining large, complex, and global financial enterprises. This simple truth supports the unpleasant working hypothesis that the banking megamergers of the 1990s may have emerged as a dialectical market response to FDICIA's effort to curtail TBTDA forbearances. On this argument, megamergers hope to create institutions so large or complex that their creditors can continue to count on qualifying for FDICIA's systemic-risk exception as a matter of course.
The increased accountability that the FDIC Improvement Act imparts to banking regulators might have been enough to minimize TBTDA merger incentives in the 1980s.
In those bygone days, bank balance sheets were easier to monitor, interstate and crossindustry acquisitions were more strictly regulated, and the largest U.S. bank was much smaller and less globally involved than it is today.
Several ways exist for regulatory economists who have fuller access to financialinstitution data to test more decisively for TBTDA effects. The first place to look is in markets for uninsured bank and bank holding-company debt. The size of TBTDA benefits can arguably be measured by analyzing premerger and postmerger spreads between the market yields on acquired and target banks' direct debt and market yields on the debt their parent holding companies issue. TBTDA benefits from megamergers should produce significant announcement-day effects on the price of acquirer and target debt. Support for this hypothesis is found in evidence assembled by Flannery and Sorescu (1996) that during 1983-1991 conjectural government guarantees and bankspecific risks were impounded into the prices of the subordinated debentures of bank holding companies.
It would also be useful to use accounting datasets and regression techniques to separate TBTDA effects from putative measures of the monopoly rents that might be associated with size. TBTDA benefits are apt to be revealed by postmerger surges in leverage, uninsured liabilities, nonperforming loans, and other risk exposures. Monopoly rents are apt to be associated with premerger market overlap and postmerger increases in the share of credit-card business and control of trading, ATM, and other payments networks.
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